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Abstract 
We propose a new definition of actual causes, 
using structural equations to model counterfac­
tuals. We show that the definition yields a plausi­
ble and elegant account of causation that handles 
well examples which have caused problems for 
other definitions and resolves major difficulties in 
the traditional account. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
What does it mean that an event A actually causes event 
B? This is a question that goes beyond mere philosophical 
speculation. As Good [1993] argues persuasively, in many 
legal settings, what needs to be established (for determining 
responsibility) is not a counterfactual kind of causation, but 
"cause in fact." A typical example considers two fires ad­
vancing toward a house. If fire A burned the house before 
fire B, we (and many juries nationwide) would consider 
fire A "the actual cause" for the damage, even supposing 
the house would have definitely burned down by fire B, if 
it were not for A. Actual causation is also important in arti­
ficial intelligence applications. Whenever we undertake to 
explain a set of events that unfold in a specific scenario, the 
explanation produced must acknowledge the actual cause of 
those events. The automatic generation of adequate expla­
nations, a task essential in planning, diagnosis and natural 
language processing, therefore requires a formal analysis 
of the concept of actual cause. 
Giving a precise and useful definition of actual causality is 
notoriously difficult. The philosophical literature has been 
struggling with this notion since the days of Hume [ 1739]. 
(See [Sosa and Tooley 1993], [Hall 2002], and [Pearl2000] 
for some recent discussions.) To borrow just one example 
from Hall [2002], suppose a bolt lightning hits a tree and 
starts a forest fire. It seems reasonable to say that the 
lightning bolt is a cause of the fire. (Indeed, the description 
"the lightning bolt ... starts a forest fire" can be viewed as 
saying this.) But what about the oxygen in the air and the 
fact that the wood was dry? Presumably, if there has not 
been oxygen or the wood was wet there would not have 
been a fire. Carrying this perhaps to the point of absurdity, 
what about the Big Bang? This problem is relatively easy 
to deal with, but there are a host of other, far more subtle, 
difficulties that have been raised over the years. 
Here we give a definition of actual causality based on the 
language of structural equations; in a companion paper 
([Halpern and Pearl 2001]; see also the full paper [Halpern 
and Pearl 2000]), we give a definition of (causal) explana­
tion using the definition of causality. The use of structural 
equations as a model for causal relationships is standard 
in the social sciences, and seems to go back to the work 
of Sewall Wright in the 1920s (see [Goldberger 1972] for 
a discussion); the framework we use here is due to Pearl 
[1995], and is further developed in [Galles and Pearl 1997; 
Halpern 2000; Pearl 2000]. While it is hard to argue that 
our definition (or any other definition, for that matter) is 
the "right definition", we show that it deals well with the 
difficulties that have plagued other approaches in the past, 
especially those exemplified by the rather extensive com­
pendium of Hall [2002]. 
There has been extensive discussion about causality in the 
literature, particularly in the philosophy literature. To keep 
this paper to manageable length, we spend only minimal 
time describing other approaches and comparing ours to 
them. We refer the reader to [Hall 2002; Pearl 2000; Sosa 
and Tooley 1993; Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 1993] 
for details and criticism of the probabilistic and logical 
approaches to causality in the philosophy literature. (We do 
try to point out where our definition does better than perhaps 
the best known approach, due to Lewis [1986, 2000] in the 
course of discussing the examples.) 
There has also been work in the AI literature on causal­
ity. Perhaps the closest to this are papers by Pearl and his 
colleagues that use the structural-model approach. The def­
inition of causality in this paper was inspired by an earlier 
paper of Pearl's [ 1998] that defined actual causality in terms 
of a construction called a causal beam. The causal beam 
definition was later modified somewhat (see [Pearl 2000, 
Chapter 10]), largely due to the considerations addressed 
in this paper. The definition given here is more transparent 
and handles a number of cases better (see Example 4.4). 
Tian and Pearl [2000] give results on calculating the prob­
ability that A is a necessary cause of B-that is, the proba­
bility that B would not have occurred if A had not occurred. 
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Necessary causality is related to but different from actual 
causality, as the definitions should make clear. Other work 
(for example, [Heckerman and Shachter 1995]) focuses on 
when a random variable X is the cause of a random vari­
able Y; by way of contrast, we focus on when an event 
such as X = x causes an event such as Y = y. As we 
shall see, many of the subtleties that arise when dealing 
with events simply disappear if we look at causality at the 
level of random variables. Finally, there is also a great 
deal of work in AI on formal action theory (see, for exam­
ple, [Lin 1995; Sandewall1994]), which is concerned with 
the proper way of incorporating causal relationships into a 
knowledge base so as to guide actions. The focus of our 
work is quite different; we are concerned with extracting 
the actual causality relation from such a knowledge base, 
coupled with a specific scenario. 
2 CAUSAL MODELS: A REVIEW 
We briefly review the basic definitions of causal models, 
as defined in terms of structural equations, and the syntax 
and semantics of a language for reasoning about causality. 
See [Galles and Pearl 1997; Halpern 2000; Pearl 2000] for 
more details, motivation, and intuition. 
Causal Models: The basic picture here is that the world 
is described by random variables, some of which may have 
a causal influence on others. This influence is modeled by a 
set of structural equations, where each equation represents 
a distinct mechanism (or law) in the world, one that may be 
modified (by external actions) without altering the others. 
In practice, it seems useful to split the random variables into 
two sets, the exogenous variables, whose values are deter­
mined by factors outside the model, and the endogenous 
variables. It is these endogenous variables whose values 
are described by the structural equations. 
More formally, a signatureS is a tuple (U, V, 'R}, where 
U is a finite set of exogenous variables, V is a finite set of 
endogenous variables, and n associates with every variable 
Y E U U V a nonempty set 'R(Y) of possible values for Y 
(that is, the set of values over which Y ranges). A causal 
model (or structural model) over signature S is a tuple 
M = (S,:F), where:Fassociates with each variableX E V 
a ftmction denoted Fx such that Fx : (xuEuR(U)) x 
(xYEV-{x}R(Y))-+ R(X). Fx tells us the value ofX 
given the values of all the other variables in U U V. 
Example 2.1: Suppose that we want to reason about a forest 
fire that could be caused by either lightning or a match lit 
by an arsonist. Then the causal model would have the 
following endogenous variables (and perhaps others): 
• F for fire (F = 1 if there is one, F = 0 otherwise) 
• L for lightning (L = 1 if lightning occurred, L = 0 
otherwise) 
• ML for match lit (ML = I if the match was lit and 
ML = 0 otherwise). 
The set U of exogenous variables includes things we need to 
assume so as to render all relationships deterministic (such 
as whether the wood is dry, there is enough oxygen in the 
air, etc.). If i1 is a setting of the exogenous variables that 
makes a forest fire possible (i.e., the wood is sufficiently 
dry, there is oxygen in the air, and so on) then, for example, 
FF(il, L,ML) is such that F = I if L = 1 or ML = 1.1 
Given a causal model M = (S, :F), a (possibly empty) 
vector X of variables in V, and vectors x and i1 of values 
for the variables in X and U, we can define a new causal 
model denoted M x ._fi over the signature S x = (U, V -
X, 'R.Iv-x ). Intuitively, this is the causal model that results 
when the variables in X are set to x by some external 
action that affects only the variables in X; we do not model 
the action or its causes explicitly. Formally, M x .... :x = 
(S x, ;:x.-:x), where F� ,_fi is obtained from Fy by setting 
the values of the variables in X to x. 
It may seem strange that we are trying to understand causal­
ity using causal models, which clearly already encode 
causal relationships. Our reasoning is not circular. Our 
aim is not to reduce causation to noncausal concepts, but to 
interpret questions about causes of specific events in fully 
specified scenarios in terms of generic causal knowledge 
such as what we obtain from the equations of physics. The 
causal models encode background knowledge about the ten­
dency of certain event types to cause other event types (such 
as the fact that lightning can cause forest fires). We use the 
models to determine the causes and explanations of single 
events, such as whether it was arson that caused the fire of 
June 10, 2000, given what is known or assumed about that 
particular fire. 
We can describe (some salient features of) a causal model 
M using a causal network. This is a graph with nodes 
corresponding to the random variables in V and an edge 
from a node labeled X to one labeled Y ifFy depends 
on the value of X. Intuitively, variables can have a causal 
effect only on their descendants in the causal network; if Y 
is not a descendant of X, then a change in the value of X 
has no affect on the value of Y. In this paper, we restrict 
attention to what are called recursive (or acyclic) equations; 
these are ones that can be described with a causal network 
that is a dag. It should be clear that if M is a recursive 
causal model, then there is always a unique solution to the 
equations in M x .... :r• given a setting i1 for the variables in 
U (we call such a setting i1 a context). 
As we shall see, there are many nontrivial decisions to be 
made when choosing the structural model. The exogenous 
variables to some extent encode the background situation, 
that which we wish to take for granted. Other implicit back­
ground assumptions are encoded in the structural equations 
themselves. Suppose that we are trying to decide whether a 
lightning bolt or a match was the cause of the forest fire, and 
we want to take for granted that there is sufficient oxygen 
in the air and the wood is dry. We could model the dryness 
of the wood by an exogenous variable D with values 0 (the 
wood is wet) and I (the wood is dry). By making D 
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exogenous, its value is assumed to be given and out of the 
control of the modeler. We could also take the amount of 
oxygen as an exogenous variable (for example, there could 
be a variable 0 with two values-0, for insufficient oxygen, 
and 1, for sufficient oxygen); alternatively, we could choose 
not to model oxygen explicitly at all. For example, suppose 
we have, as before, a random variable ML for match lit, 
and another variable WB for wood burning, with values 0 
(it's not) and l (it is). The structural equation Fw 8 would 
describe the dependence of WB on D and ML. By setting 
Fw 8 ( 1, 1) = 1, we are saying that the wood will bum if 
the match is lit and the wood is dry. Thus, the equation is 
implicitly modeling our assumption that there is sufficient 
oxygen for the wood to burn. If we were to explicitly model 
the amount of oxygen in the air (which certainly might be 
relevant if we were analyzing fires on Mount Everest), then 
Fw 8 would also take values of 0 as an argument. 
Besides encoding some of our implicit assumptions, the 
structural equations can be viewed as encoding the causal 
mechanisms at work. Changing the underlying causal 
mechanism can affect what counts as a cause. Section 4 
provides several examples of the importance of the choice 
of random variables and the choice of causal mechanism. 
It is not always straightforward to decide what the "right" 
causal model is in a given situation, nor is it always obvi­
ous which of two causal models is "better" in some sense. 
These may be difficult decisions and often lie at the heart 
of determining actual causality in the real world. Neverthe­
less, we believe that the tools we provide here should help 
in making principled decisions about those choices. 
Syntax and Semantics: To make the definition of actual 
causality precise, it is helpful to have a logic with a formal 
syntax. Given a signature S = (U, V, R), a formula of 
the form X = x, for X E V and x E R(X), is called a 
primitive event. A basic causa/formula (overS) is one of 
the form [Y, o- y1, ... , Yk o- Yk]'P where cp is a Boolean 
combination of primitive events, Y,, ... , Yk, X are vari­
ables in V, with Yi, .. . , Yk are distinct, x E R( X), and 
y; E R(}i). Such a formula is abbreviated as [Y o- Y1'P· 
The special case where k = 0 is abbreviated as cp. In­
tuitively, [Y, o- y,, . . .  , Yk o- Yk]cp says that cp holds in 
the counterfactual world that would arise if Y; is set toy;, 
i = 1, . . .  , k. A causal formula is a Boolean combination 
of basic causal formulas. 
A causal formula 'lj; is true or false in a causal model, given 
a context. We write ( M, u) f= '1/J if '1/J is true in causal 
model M given context u. ( M, u) f= [Y o- Y1 (X = x) 
if the variable X has value x in the (unique, since we are 
dealing with recursive models) solution to the equations in 
M.y_ii in context u (that is, the unique vector of values 
for the exogenous variables that simultaneously satisfies 
all equations Fi-ii, Z E V- Y, with the variables in U 
set to ii). (M, u) F [Y ....... YJcp for an arbitrary Boolean 
combination <p of formulas of the form X = x is defined 
similarly. We extend the definition to arbitrary causal for­
mulas, i.e., Boolean combinations of basic causal formulas, 
in the standard way. 
Note that the structural equations are deterministic. We can 
make sense out of probabilistic counterfactual statements, 
even conditional ones (the probability that X would be 3 
if Y1 were 2, given that Y is in fact 1) in this framework 
(see [Balke and Pearl 1994 ]), by putting a probability on 
the set of possible contexts. This is not necessary for our 
discussion of causality, although it plays a more significant 
role in the discussion of explanation. 
3 THE DEFINITION OF CAUSE 
With all this notation in hand, we can now give our defini­
tion of actual cause ("cause" for short). We want to make 
sense out of statements of the form "event A is an actual 
cause of event <p (in context ii)". As we said earlier, the 
context is the background information. While this has been 
left implicit in some treatments of causality, we find it use­
ful to make it explicit. The picture here is that the context 
(and the structural equations) are given. Intuitively, they 
encode the background knowledge. All the relevant events 
are known. The only question is picking out which of them 
are the causes of <p or, alternatively, testing whether a given 
set of events can be considered the cause of <p. 
The types of events that we allow as actual causes are 
ones of the form X1 = X! /1. . . . /1. Xk = Xk-that is, 
conjunctions of primitive events; we typically abbreviate 
this as X = x. The events that can be caused are arbitrary 
Boolean combinations of primitive events. 
Definition 3.1: (Actual cause) X =xis an actual cause of 
<pin (M, it) if the following three conditions hold: 
ACl. (M, it) F (X = x) /1. <p. (That is, both X= X and 
<pare true in the actual world.) 
AC2. There exists a partition (Z, W) of V with X � i 
and some setting (.i',w') of the variables in (X, W) 
such that if (M, u) F z = z* for z E i, then 
(a) (M,il) 1= [X--- .i',W--- w'j-,cp. In wards, 
changing (X, w) from (x, w) to (x', w') changes 
<p from true to false, 
(b) (M, u) f= [X ....... x, w ....... w', i' ,_. Z*]cp for 
all subsets Z' of i. In words, setting w to W1 
should have no effect on <p as long as X is kept 
at its current value x, even if all the variables in 
an arbitrary subset of Z are set to their original 
values in the context a. 
AC3. X is minimal; no subset of X satisfies conditions 
AC 1 and AC2. Minimality ensures that only those 
elements of the conjunction X = x that are essential 
for changing cp cin AC2(a) are considered part of a 
cause; inessential elements are pruned. I 
Note that we allow X = x to be a cause of itself. While we 
do not find such trivial causality terribly bothersome, it can 
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be avoided by requiring that X = x 1\ ...,IP be consistent for 
x = xto be a cause ofcp. 
The core of this definition lies in AC2. Informally, the 
variables in Z should be thought of as describing the "ac­
tive causal process" from X to cp. (also called "intrinsic 
process" by Lewis [1986]).1 These are the variables that 
mediate between X and cp. Indeed, we can define an ac­
tive causal process from X = x to 1.p as a minimal set 
Z that satisfies AC2. AC2(a) is reminiscent of the tradi­
tional counterfactual criterion of Lewis [ 1986], according 
to which cp should be false if it were not for X being x. 
However, AC2(a) is more permissive than the traditional 
criterion; it allows the dependence of cp on X to be tested 
under special circumstances in which the variables W are 
held constant at some setting w'. This modification of the 
traditional criterion was proposed by Pearl [ 1998, 2000] 
and was named structural contingency-an alteration of the 
model M that involves the breakdown of some mechanisms 
(possibly emerging from external action) but no change in 
the context il. The need to invoke such contingencies will 
be made clear in Example 3.2. 
AC2(b), which has no obvious analogue in the literature, 
is an attempt to counteract the "permissiveness" of AC2(a) 
with regard to structural contingencies. Essentially, it en­
sures that X alone suffices to bring about the change from 
1.p to -.cp; setting W to �� merely eliminates spurious side 
effects that tend to mask the action of X. It captures the fact 
that setting w to w' does not affect the causal process by 
requiring that changing W from w to ;' has no effect on the 
value of 1.p. Moreover, although the values in the variables 
Z involved in the causal process may be perturbed by the 
change, the perturbation has no impact on the value of 1.p. 
The upshot of this requirement is that we are not at liberty to 
conduct the counterfactual test of AC2(a) under an arbitrary 
alteration of the model. The alteration considered must not 
affect the causal process. Clearly, if the contingencies con­
sidered are limited to "freezing" variables at their actual 
value, so that ( M, il) F w = W1, then AC2(b) is satisfied 
automatically. However, as the examples below show, gen­
uine causation may sometimes be revealed only through a 
broader class of counterfactual tests in which variables in 
W are set to values that differ from their actual values. In 
[Pearl 2000], a notion of contributory cause is defined as 
well as actual cause. Roughly speaking, if AC2(a) holds 
only with W = w' f. w, the A is a contributory cause of 
B; actual causality holds only ifW = w. 
We remark that, like the definition here, the causal beam def­
inition [Pearl 2000] tests for the existence of counterfactual 
dependency in an auxiliary model of the world, modified by 
a select set of structural contingencies. However, whereas 
1Recently, Lewis [2000] has abandoned attempts to define 
"intrinsic process" formally. Pearl's "causal beam" [Pearl 2000, 
p. 3 18] is a special kind of active causal process, in which AC2(b) 
is expected to hold (with Z """ z) for all settings w' of W, not 
necessarily the one used in (a). 
the beam criterion selects the choice of contingencies de­
pends only on the relationship a variable and its parents in 
the causal diagram, the current definition selects the mod­
ifying contingencies based on the specific cause and effect 
pair that is being tested. This refinement permits our def­
inition to avoid certain pitfalls (see Example 4.4) that are 
associated with graphical criteria for actual causation. 
AC3 is a minimality condition. Heckerman and Shachter 
[ 1995] have a similar minimality requirement; Lewis [2000] 
mentions the need for minimality as well. Interestingly, in 
all the examples we have considered, AC3 forces the cause 
to be a single conjunct of the form X = x. Eiter and 
Lukasiewicz [200 1] and, independently, Hopkins [200 1], 
have recently proved that this is in fact a consequence of 
our definition. 
How reasonable are these requirements? In particular, is 
it appropriate to invoke structural changes in the defini­
tion of actual causation? The following example may help 
illustrate why we believe it is. 
Example 3.2: Suppose that two arsonists drop lit matches 
in different parts of a dry forest, and both cause trees to 
start burning. Consider two scenarios. In the first, called 
"disjunctive," either match by itself suffices to burn down 
the whole forest. That is, even if only one match were lit, 
the forest would bum down. In the second scenario, called 
"conjunctive," both matches are necessary to burn down 
the forest; if only one match were lit, the fire would die 
down. We can describe the essential structure of these two 
scenarios using a causal model with four variables: 
• an exogenous variable U which determines, among 
other things, the motivation and state of mind of 
the arsonists. For simplicity, assume that R(U) = 
{ uoo, u 10, uo1, u 1 I}; if U = uii, then the first arsonist 
intends to start a fire iff i = 1 and the second arson­
ist intends to start a fire iff j = I. In both scenarios 
U =ull· 
• endogenous variables ML1 and ML2, each either 0 or 
I, where MLi = 0 if arsonist i doesn't drop the match 
and ML; = I if he does, fori = 1, 2. 
• an endogenous variable FB for forest bums down, with 
values 0 (it doesn't) and I (it does). 
Both scenarios have the same causal network (see 
Figure l ); they differ only in the equation for FB. 
For the disjunctive scenario we have Fp8 (u, 1, 1) = 
Fpa(u,O, 1) = Fpa(u, 1 , 0) = land Fpa(u,O,O) = 0 
(where u E n(U)); for the conjunctive scenario we have 
Fpa(u, I, l) = l and Fp8(u, 0, 0) = Fp8(u, 1, 0) = 
Fp8 (u, 0, l) = 0. In general, we expect that the causal 
model for reasoning about forest fires would involve many 
other variables; in particular, variables for other potential 
causes of forest fires such lightning and unattended camp­
fires; here we focus on that part of the causal model that 
involves forest fires started by arsonists. Since for causal­
ity we assume that all the relevant facts are given, we can 
assume here that it is known that there were no unattended 
campfires and there was no lightning, which makes it safe to 
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ignore that portion of the causal model. Denote by M 1 and 
M2 the causal models associated with the disjunctive and 
conjunctive scenarios, respectively. The causal network for 
the relevant portion of M 1 and M2 is described in Figure 1. 
u 
ML10ML2 
FB 
Figure 1: The causal network for M1 and Mz. 
Despite the differences in the underlying models, it is not 
hard to show that each of ML 1 = 1 and MLz = I is a cause 
of FB = 1 in both scenarios. We present the argument for 
ML1 
= 1 here. To show that ML1 = 1 is a cause in M1 
let Z = {ML1,FB}, so W = {ML2}. It is easy to see 
that the contingency ML2 = 0 satisfies the two conditions 
in AC2. AC2(a) is satisfied because, in the absence of the 
second arsonist (ML2 = 0), the first arsonist is necessary 
and sufficient for the fire to occur (FB = 1 ). AC2(b) 
is satisfied because, if the first match is lit (ML1 = 1) the 
contingency ML2 = 0 does not prevent the fire from burning 
the forest. Thus, ML1 = 1 is a cause of FB = 1 in Mt. 
(Note that we needed to set ML2 to 0, contrary to facts, in 
order to reveal the latent dependence of FB on ML 1· Such a 
setting constitutes a structural change in the original model, 
since it involves the removal of some structural equations.) 
A similar argument shows that ML 1 = I is also a cause 
of FB = 1 in Mz. (Again, taking Z = {ML,,FB} and 
W :::::: {ML2} works.) 
This example also illustrates the need for the minimality 
condition AC3. !f lighting a match qualifies as the cause of 
fire then lighting a match and sneezing would also pass the 
tests of AC1 and AC2 and awkwardly qualify as the cause 
of fire. Minimality serves here to strip "sneezing" and other 
irrelevant, over-specific details from the cause. I 
This is a good place to illustrate the need for structural con­
tingencies in the analysis of actual causation. The reason 
we consider ML1 = 1 to be a cause of FB = 1 in M1 is 
that if ML2 had been 0, rather than 1, FB would depend on 
MLt. In words, we imagine a situation in which the second 
match is not lit, and we then reason counterfactually that 
the forest would not have burned down if it were not for the 
first match. 
4 EXAMPLES 
In this section we show how our definition of actual causal­
ity handles some examples that have caused problems for 
other definitions. The full paper has further examples. 
Example 4.1: The first example is due to Bennett (and 
appears in [Sosa and Tooley 1993, pp. 222-223]). Suppose 
that there was a heavy rain in April and electrical storms in 
the following two months; and in June the lightning took 
hold. If it hadn't been for the heavy rain in April, the forest 
would have caught fire in May. The question is whether 
the April rains caused the forest fire. According to a naive 
counterfactual analysis, they do, since if it hadn't rained, 
there wouldn't have been a forest fire in June. Bennett says 
"That is unacceptable. A good enough story of events and 
of causation might give us reason to accept some things that 
seem intuitively to be false, but no theory should persuade 
us that delaying a forest's burning for a month (or indeed a 
minute) is causing a forest fire." 
In our framework, as we now show, it is indeed false to say 
that the April rains caused the fire, but they were a cause of 
there being a fire in June, as opposed to May. This seems to 
us intuitively right. To capture the situation, it suffices to use 
a simple model with three endogenous random variables: 
• AS for "April showers", with two values-{) standing 
for did not rain heavily in April and I standing for 
rained heavily in April; 
• ES for "electric storms", with four possible values: 
(0, 0) (no electric storms in either May or June), (1,0) 
(electric storms in May but not June), (0,1) (storms 
in June but not May), and (1,1) (storms in April and 
May); 
• and F for "fire", with three possible values: 0 (no fire 
at all), 1 (fire in May), or 2 (fire in June). 
We do not describe the context explicitly, either here or 
in the other examples. Assume its value ii is such that it 
ensures that there is a shower in April, there are electric 
storms in both May and June, there is sufficient oxygen, 
there are no other potential causes of fire (like dropped 
matches), no other inhibitors of fire (alert campers setting 
up a bucket brigade), and so on. That is, we choose i1 so as 
to allow us to focus on the issue at hand and to ensure that 
the right things happened (there was both fire and rain). 
We will not bother writing out the details of the structural 
equations-they should be obvious, given the story (at least, 
for the context il); this is also the case for all the other 
examples in this section. The causal network is simple: 
there are edges from AS to F and from ES to F. It is easy 
to check that each of the following hold. 
• AS = 1 is a cause ofthe June fire (F = 2) (taking 
W = {ES} and Z = {AS, F}) but not of fire (F = 
2VF=1). 
• ES = (1, I) is a cause of both F = 2 and (F 
1 V F = 2). Having electric storms in both May and 
June caused there to be a fire. 
• AS = I 1\ ES = ( l, 1) is not a cause of F = 2, because 
it violates the minimality requirement of AC3; each 
conjunct alone is a cause ofF = 2. Similarly, AS = 
I 1\ ES = ( 1, 1) is not a cause of ( F = 1 V F = 2). 
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The distinction between April showers being a cause of the 
fire (which they are not, according to our analysis) and April 
showers being a cause of a fire in June (which they are) is 
one that seems not to have been made in the discussion of 
this problem ( cf. [Lewis 2000]); nevertheless, it seems to 
us an important distinction. I 
Although we did not describe the context explicitly in Ex­
ample 4.1, it still played a crucial role. If the presence of 
oxygen is relevant then we must take this factor out of the 
context and introduce it as an explicit endogenous variables. 
Doing so can affect the causality picture. The next example 
already shows the importance of choosing an appropriate 
granularity in modeling the causal process and its structure. 
Example 4.2: The following story from [Hall 2002] is 
an example of preemption, where there are two potential 
causes of an event, one of which preempts the other. An 
adequate definition of causality must deal with preemption 
in all of its guises. 
Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them 
at a bottle. Suzy's rock gets there first, shattering 
the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accu­
rate, Billy's would have shattered the bottle had 
it not been preempted by Suzy's throw. 
Commonsense suggests that Suzy's throw is the cause of the 
shattering, but Billy's is not. This holds in our framework 
too, but only if we model the story appropriately. Consider 
first a coarse causal model, with three endogenous variables: 
• ST for "Suzy throws", with values 0 (Suzy does not 
throw) and 1 (she does); 
• BT for "Billy throws", with values 0 (he doesn't) and 
1 (he does); 
• BS for "bottle shatters', with values 0 (it doesn't shat­
ter) and 1 (it does). 
Again, we have a simple causal network, with edges from 
both ST and BT to BS. In this simple causal network, 
BT and ST play absolutely symmetric roles, with BS = 
ST V BT, and there is nothing to distinguish one from the 
other. Not surprisingly, both Billy's throw and Suzy's throw 
are classified as causes of the bottle shattering. 
The trouble with this model is that it cannot distinguish 
the case where both rocks hit the bottle simultaneously (in 
which case it would be reasonable to say that both ST = 1 
and BT = 1 are causes of BS = 1) from the case where 
Suzy's rock hits first. The model has to be refined to express 
this distinction. One way is to invoke a dynamic model 
[Pearl 2000, p. 326). Another way to gain expressiveness 
is to allow BS to be three valued, with values 0 (the bottle 
doesn't shatter), 1 (it shatters as a result of being hit by 
Suzy's rock), and 2 (it shatters as a result of being hit by 
Billy's rock). We leave it to the reader to check thatST = 1 
is a cause of BS = 1, but BT = 1 is not (if Suzy hadn't 
thrown but Billy had, then we would have BS = 2). Thus, 
to some extent, this solves our problem. But it borders on 
cheating; the answer is almost programmed into the model 
by invoking the relation "as a result of', which requires the 
identification of the actual cause. 
A more useful choice is to add two new random variables 
to the model: 
• BHfor "Billy's rock hits the (intact) bottle", with val­
ues 0 (it doesn't) and 1 (it does); and 
• SH for "Suzy's rock hits the bottle", again with values 
0 and 1. 
With this addition, we can go back to BS being two-valued. 
In this model, we have the causal network shown in Figure 
2, with the arrow SH -+ BH being inhibitory; BH = BT 1\ 
·SH (that is, BH = 1 iff BT = 1 and SH = 0). Note that, to 
simplify the presentation, we have omitted the exogenous 
variables from the causal network in Figure 2. In addition, 
we have only given the arrows for the particular context of 
interest, where Suzy throws first. In a context where Billy 
throws first, the arrow would go from BH to SH rather than 
going from SH to BH, as it does in the figure. 
Figure 2: The rock-throwing example. 
Now it is the case that ST = 1 is a cause of BS == 1. To 
satisfy AC2, we choose W = { BT} and w' = 0 and note 
that, because BT is set to 0, BS will track the setting of 
ST. Also note that BT = 1 is not a cause of BS = 1; there 
is no partition Z U W that satisfies AC2. Attempting the 
symmetric choice W = {BT} and w' = 0 would violate 
AC2(b) (with Z' = { BH} ), because cp becomes false when 
we set ST == 0 and restore BH to its current value ofO. 
This example illustrates the need for invoking subsets of Z 
in AC2(b). I 
Example 4.3: Is causality transitive? Consider the fol­
lowing story, again taken from (an early version of) [Hall 
2002]: 
Billy contracts a serious but nonfatal disease. He 
is hospitalized and treated on Monday, so is fine 
Tuesdsay morning. Had Monday's doctor for­
gotten to treat Billy, Tuesday's doctor would have 
treated him, and he would have been fine Tues­
day afternoon. But there is a twist: one dose of 
medication is harmless, but two doses are lethal. 
The causal model for this story is straightforward. There 
are three random variables: MT for Monday's treatment (1 
if Billy was treated Monday; 0 otherwise), TT for Tuesday's 
treatment ( 1 if Billy was treated Tuesday; 0 otherwise), and 
BMC for Billy's medical condition (0 if Billy is fine both 
Tuesday morning and Tuesday afternoon; 1 if Billy is sick 
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Tuesday morning, fine Tuesday afternoon; 2 if Billy is sick 
both Tuesday morning and afternoon; 3 if Bill is fine Tues­
day morning and dead Tuesday afternoon). In the causal 
network corresponding to this causal model, shown in Fig­
ure 3, there is an edge from MT to TT, since whether the 
Tuesday treatment occurs depends on whether the Monday 
treatment occurs, and edges from both MT and 1T to BMC, 
since Billy's medical condition depends on both treatments. 
MT-TT 
\I 
BMC 
Figure 3: Billy's medical condition. 
In this causal model, it is true that MT = 1 is a cause of 
BMC = 0, as we would expect-because Billy is treated 
Monday, he is not treated on Tuesday morning, and thus 
recovers Tuesday afternoon. 2 MT = I is also a cause of 
1T = 0, as we would expect, and 1T = 0 is a cause of 
Billy's being alive (BMC = 0 v BMC = I v BMC = 2). 
However, MT = I is not a cause of Billy's being alive. It 
fails condition AC2(a): setting MT = 0 still leads to Billy's 
being alive (with W = 0). Note that it would not help to 
takeW = {IT} . For ifTT= O,thenBilly is alive no matter 
what MT is, while if 1T = 1, then Billy is dead when MT 
has its original value, so AC2(b) is violated (with Z' = 0). 
This shows that causality is not transitive, according to our 
definitions. Although MT = I is a cause of 1T = 0 and 
1T = 0 is a cause of BMC = 0 v BMC = 1 V BMC = 2, 
MT= I is not a cause ofBMC = OVBMC = 1 VBMC = 2. 
Nor is causality closed under right weakening: MT = 1 is 
a cause of BMC = 0, which logically implies BMC = 
0 V BMC = 1 V BMC = 2, which is not caused by MT = 1. 
Lewis [I986, 2000] insists that causality is transitive, partly 
to be able to deal with preemption [Lewis 1986]. Our 
approach handles preemption without needing to invoke 
transitivity, which, as Lewis's own examples show, leads to 
counterintuitive conclusions. I 
Clause AC2(b) in the definition is complicated by the need 
to check that no change in the value of the variables in Z 
can affect the value of <.p. In all the previous examples, 
Z = z* for each variable Z E i. Could we not just require 
this? The following example shows that we cannot. 
Example 4.4: Imagine that a vote takes place. For sim­
plicity, two people vote. The measure is passed if at least 
one of them votes in favor. In fact, both of them vote in 
favor, and the measure passes. This version of the story is 
almost identical to Example 3.2. If we use V1 and Vz to 
denote how the voters vote (V; = 0 if voter i votes against 
and Vi = I if she votes in favor) and P to denote whether 
the measure passes (P = I if it passes, P = 0 if it doesn't), 
2Lewis's [1986] revised · criterion of counterfactual­
dependence-chain fails in this example; BMC does not depend 
on either MT or TT in the context given. 
then in the context where V1 = V2 = I, it is easy to see that 
each of Vi = I and V2 = I is a cause of P = l .  However, 
suppose we now assume that there is a voting machine that 
tabulates the votes. Let M represent the total number of 
votes recorded by the machine. Clearly M = V1 + V2 and 
P = 1 iff M � 1. The following causal network repre­
sents this more refined version of the story. In this more 
Figure 4: An example showing the need for AC2(b). 
refined scenario, vl = 1 and v2 = 1 are still both causes 
of P = l .  Consider V1 = I. Take Z = {Vi, M, P} and 
W = V:t. Much like the simpler version of the story, if 
we choose the contingency V2 = 0, then Pis counterfac­
tually dependent on V1, so AC2(a) holds. To check if this 
contingency satisfies AC2(b), we set Vi to 1 (their original 
value) and check that setting V2 to 0 does not change the 
value of P. This is indeed the case. Although M becomes 
1, not 2 as it is when V1 = Vz = 1, nevertheless, P = 1 
continues to hold, so AC2(b) is satisfied and V1 = 1 is a 
cause of P = 1. However, if we had insisted in AC2(b) 
that (M, u) f= [X of- x, W of- w']Z = z* for all variables 
Z E Z (which in this case means that M would have to 
retain its original value of2 when V1 = 1 and V2 = 0), then 
neither V1 = 1 nor V2 = 1 would be a cause of P = l. I 
We remark that this example is not handled correctly by 
Pearl's causal beam definition. According to the causal 
beam definition, there is no cause for P = 1! It can be 
shown if X = x is an actual (or contributory) cause of 
Y = y according to the causal beam definition given in 
[Pearl 2000], then it is an actual cause according to the 
definition here. As Example 4.4 shows, the converse is not 
necessarily true. 
Example 4.5: This example concerns what Hall calls the 
distinction between causation and determination. Again, 
we quote Hall [2002]: 
You are standing at a switch in the railroad tracks. 
Here comes the train: If you flip the switch, you'll 
send the train down the left-hand track; if you 
leave it where it is, the train will follow the right­
hand track. Either way, the train will arrive at 
the same point, since the tracks reconverge up 
ahead. Your action is not among the causes of 
this arrival; it merely helps to determine how the 
arrival is brought about (namely, via the left-hand 
track, or via the right-hand track). 
Again, our causal model gets this right. Suppose we have 
three random variables: 
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• F for "flip", with values 0 (you don't flip the switch) 
and 1 (you do); 
• T for "track", with values 0 (the train goes on the 
left-hand track) and I (it goes on the right-hand track); 
• A for "arrival", with values 0 (the train does not arrive 
at the point ofreconvergence) and I (it does). 
Now it is easy to see that flipping the switch (F = I) does 
cause the train to go down the left-hand track (T = 0), but 
does not cause it to arrive (A = I), thanks to AC2(a}-­
whether or not the switch is flipped, the train arrives. 
However, our proposal goes one step beyond this simple 
picture. Suppose that we model the tracks using two vari­
ables: 
• LT for "left-track", with values 1 (the train goes on the 
left-hand track) and 0 (it does not); and 
• RT for "right-track", with values 1 (the train goes on 
the right-hand track) and 0 (it does not). 
The resulting causal diagram is shown in Figure 5 ;  it is iso­
morphic to a class of problems Pearl [2000] calls "switch­
ing causation". Lo and behold, this representation classifies 
F = I as a cause of A, which, at first sight, may seem coun­
terintuitive: Can a change in representation turn a non-cause 
into a cause? 
A 
Figure 5: Flipping the switch. 
It can and it should! The change to a two-variable model 
is not merely syntactic, but represents a profound change 
in the story. The two-variable model depicts the tracks as 
two independent mechanisms, thus allowing one track to be 
set (by action or mishap) to false (or true) without affecting 
the other. Specifically, this permits the disastrous mishap 
of flipping the switch while the left track is malfunctioning. 
Such abnormal eventualities are imaginable and expressible 
in the two-variable model, but not in the one-variable model. 
The potential for such eventualities is precisely what renders 
F = I a cause ofthe A in the model of Figure 5.3 
Is flipping the switch a legitimate cause of the train's ar­
rival? Not in ideal situations, where all mechanisms work 
as specified. But this is not what causality (and causal 
modeling) are all about. Causal models earn their value in 
abnormal circumstances, created by structural contingen­
cies, such as the possibility of a malfunctioning track. It is 
3This can be seen by noting that condition AC2 is satisfied by 
the partition Z = { F, LT, A } ,  W = {RT}, and choosing w' as 
the setting R T  = 0. The event RT = 0 conflicts with F = 0 under 
normal situations. 
this possibility that should enter our mind whenever we de­
cide to designate each track as a separate mechanism (i.e., 
equation) in the model and, keeping this contingency in 
mind, it should not be too odd to name the switch position 
a cause of the train arrival (or non-arrival). I 
We conclude this section with an example that shows a 
potential problem for our definition, and suggest a solution. 
Example 4.6: Fred has his finger severed by a machine at 
the factory (FS = I). Fortunately, Fred is covered by a 
health plan. He is rushed to the hospital, where his finger is 
sewn back on. A month later, the finger is fully functional 
(FF = 1). In this story, we would not want to say that 
FS = 1 is a cause of FF = 1 and, indeed, according to our 
definition, it is not, since FF = 1 whether or not FS = 1 
(in all contingencies satisfying AC2(b)). 
However, suppose we introduce a new element to the story, 
representing a nonactual structural contingency: Larry the 
Loanshark may be waiting outside the factory with the in­
tention of cutting off Fred's finger, as a warning to him to 
repay his loan quickly. Let LL represent whether or not 
Larry is waiting and let LC represent whether Larry cuts 
of the Fred's finger. If Larry cuts offFred's finger, he will 
throw it away, so Fred will not be able to get it sewn back 
on. In the actual situation, LL = LC = 0; Larry is not 
waiting and Larry does not cut off Fred's finger. So, intu­
itively, there seems to be no harm in adding this fanciful 
element to the story. Or is there? Suppose that, if Fred's 
finger is cut off in the factory, then Larry will not be able 
to cut off the finger himself (since Fred will be rushed off 
to the hospital). Now FS = 1 becomes a cause of FF = 1. 
For in the structural contingency where LL = 1, if FS = 0 
then FF = 0 (Larry will cut off Fred's finger and throw it 
away, so it will not become functional again). Moreover, 
if FS = I, then LC = 0 and FF = I, just as in the actual 
situation.4 I 
This example seems somewhat disconcerting. Why should 
adding a fanciful scenario like Larry the Loanshark to the 
story affect (indeed, result in) the accident being a cause of 
the finger being functional one month later? While it is true 
that the accident would be judged a cause of Fred's good 
fortune by anyone who knew of Larry's vicious plan (many 
underworld figures owe their lives to "accidents" of this 
sort), the question remains how to distinguish genuine plans 
that just happened not to materialize from sheer fanciful 
scenarios that have no basis in reality. To some extent, 
the answer here is the same as the answer to essentially all 
the other concerns we have raised: it is a modeling issue. 
If we know of Larry's plan, or it seems like a reasonable 
possibility, we should add it to the model (in which case the 
accident is a cause ofthe finger being functional); otherwise 
we shouldn't. 
But this answer makes the question of how reasonable a 
possibility Larry's plan are into an aU-or-nothing decision. 
One solution to this problem is to extend our notion of 
4We thank Eric Hiddleston for bringing this issue and this 
example to our attention. 
202 HALPERN & PEARL UA I 2001 
causal model somewhat, so as to be able to capture more 
directly the intuition that the Larry the Loanshark scenario 
is indeed rather fanciful. There a number of ways of doing 
this; we choose one based on Spohn's notion of a ranking 
function (or ordinal conditional function) [Spohn 1988]. A 
ranking K on a space W is a function mapping subsets of W 
to IN* = IN U { oo} such that K(W) = 0, K(0) = oo, and 
K(A) = minwEA (K( { w} ) ) . Intuitively, an ordinal ranking 
assigns a degree of surprise to each subset of worlds in W, 
where 0 means unsurprising and higher numbers denote 
greater surprise. Let a world be a complete setting of the 
exogenous variables. Suppose that, for each context il, we 
have a ranking /"£;; on the set of worlds. The unique setting 
of the exogenous variables that holds in context il is given 
rank 0 by /"£;;; other worlds are assigned ranks according to 
how "fanciful" they are, given context il. Presumably, in 
Example 4.6, an appropriate ranking K would give a world 
where Larry is waiting to cut off Fred's finger (i.e., where 
LL = 1 )  a rather high "' ranking, to indicate that it is rather 
fanciful. We can then modify the definition of causality so 
that we can talk about X = x being an actual cause of r.p in 
(M, u) at rank k. The definition is a slight modification of 
condition AC2 in Definition 3 . 1  so the contingency ( :2 ,  ,l;') 
must hold in a world of rank at most k; we omit the formal 
details here. We then can restrict actual causality so that 
the structural contingencies involved have at most a certain 
rank. This is one way of ignoring fanciful scenarios. 
5 DISCUSSION 
We have presented a principled way of determining actual 
causes from causal knowledge. The essential principles 
of our account include using structural equations to model 
causal mechanisms; using uniform counterfactual notation 
to encode and distinguish facts, actions, outcomes, and 
contingencies; using structural contingencies to uncover 
causal dependencies; and careful screening of these con­
tingencies to avoid tampering with the causal processes to 
be uncovered. While our definitions has some unsatisfy­
ing features (see Example 4.6), we hope that the examples 
presented here illustrate how well it deals with many of the 
problematic cases found in the literature. As the examples 
have shown, much depends on choosing the "right" set of 
variables with which to model a situation, which ones to 
make exogenous, and which to make endogenous. While 
the examples have suggested some heuristics for making 
appropriate choices, we do not have a general theory for 
how to make these choices. We view this as an important 
direction for future research. 
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